Research of Smart Grid Cyber Architecture and Standards Deployment with High Adaptability for Security Monitoring by Hu, Rui et al.
   
 
Aalborg Universitet
Research of Smart Grid Cyber Architecture and Standards Deployment with High
Adaptability for Security Monitoring
Hu, Rui; Hu, Weihao; Chen, Zhe
Published in:
International Conference on Sustainable Mobility Applications, Renewables and Technology (SMART), 2015
DOI (link to publication from Publisher):
10.1109/SMART.2015.7399218
Publication date:
2015
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Hu, R., Hu, W., & Chen, Z. (2015). Research of Smart Grid Cyber Architecture and Standards Deployment with
High Adaptability for Security Monitoring. In International Conference on Sustainable Mobility Applications,
Renewables and Technology (SMART), 2015 (pp. 1-6). IEEE Press. DOI: 10.1109/SMART.2015.7399218
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: April 30, 2017
Research of Smart Grid Cyber Architecture and 
Standards Deployment with High Adaptability for 
Security Monitoring  
Rui Hu, Weihao Hu, Zhe Chen 
Department of Energy Technology, Aalborg University 
rhu@et.aau.dk, whu@et.aau.dk, zch@et.aau.dk 
  
Abstract—Security Monitoring is a critical function for smart 
grid. As a consequence of strongly relying on communication, 
cyber security must be guaranteed by the specific system. 
Otherwise, the Demand Response (DR) signals and bidding 
information can be easily forged or intercepted. Customers’ 
privacy and safety may suffer huge losses. Although OpenADR 
specifications provide continuous, secure and reliable two-way 
communications in application level defined in ISO model, which 
is also an open architecture model for adopted security systems, 
no specific or proprietary technologies is restricted to OpenADR 
itself. It is significant to develop a security monitoring system. 
This paper discussed the cyber architecture of smart grid with 
high adaptability for security monitoring. An adaptable structure 
with Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) is studied. Focusing on this 
network structure, the rational utilization of standards is 
investigated to provide a smart grid communication network 
with better performance and higher security, whilst it avoids the 
extra investment of an individual security monitoring network as 
far as possible. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A smart grid is a modernized electrical grid that uses analog 
or digital information and communication technologies to 
gather and act on information about the behaviors of suppliers 
and consumers. The analysis of bilateral information can be 
used to keep power consumption balance, improve the 
efficiency, reliability, economics, and sustainability of the 
production and distribution of the electricity. Using modern 
communication methods, more and more people can participate 
in power generation activities. However, it will bring security 
issues with strongly relying on communication technologies 
[1]. The interception and forgery of data packages flowing in 
the communication links is becoming more and more 
convenient to realize [2]. The network attack in smart grid not 
only influence users’ privacy, but also threaten the grid safety, 
event people’s life. Currently, many standards which have been 
proposed share a great concern on cyber network security. It is 
significant to develop a security monitoring system. 
Security monitoring system for Smart Grid can be realized 
in two aspects. The first one is keeping the security of 
communication network, which is mainly based on the design 
of communication protocols. The second one is preserving the 
security of the whole grid, which is mainly based on analysis 
and management of smart grid information.  
There exist requirements for smart grid cyber security as 
following [3]: 
(1) The protocols should be able to preserve privacy of its 
users. Besides, participants must be able to verify the 
authenticity and integrity of all DR events and bid 
notifications. 
(2) Untrusted entities must not be able to link DR bids to 
individual consumers and infer private information about 
individual consumers from the DR system. 
These two main requirements are guaranteed by the 
security monitoring system and the relatively mature 
communication network design. Many references have already 
investigated the privacy preserving protocols. A number of 
security guidelines and specifications for smart grid has been 
developed as well, like ENISA guidelines, ISO/IEC TR 27019, 
NIST-IR-7628 [4][5]. 
In this paper, investigation of standards and protocols used 
in security monitoring system for smart grid has been 
conducted. The security monitoring architecture proposed in 
this paper has been modelled and analyzed in order to discuss 
the deployment of standards and protocols from view of 
security. Meanwhile, this work is a part of an EU Horizon 2020 
project SmarterEMC2 [6], which aims at empowering Smart 
Grid Market Actors through information and communication 
technologies. It provides references and infrastructure of 
communication system for smart grid applications and 
guarantees the security of demand response activities. 
II. THE ARCHITECTURE OF SECURITY MONITORING SYSTEM 
A. Main Security Monitoring Actors 
According to the requirements and threatens mentioned in 
Section I, the main actors related to security monitoring are 
imported from the definitions of project SmarterEMC2. These 
actors and their descriptions are listed in tabled I and their 
communications and exchanged data will be discussed later. 
These main actors play an important role in Demand 
Response and cyber security monitoring. The main idea of this 
paper is to use concept of demilitarized zone to isolate the 
resources and core functions inside the smart grid cyber to 
protect them from attacks and provide a flexible and friendly 
interface for the security monitoring. Besides, by the 
employment of DMZ, the adaptability of the cyber could be 
improved. People are developing the standards and protocols of 
the smart grid ceaselessly, the changes of the application level 
standards are faster than the lower level standards and 
protocols, so the monitoring system may face varying 
situations. By using the proposed cyber structure, the loads of 
security monitoring behind the DMZ is alleviated and the 
pressure moves to the interfaces of the DMZ with inside cyber 
and DMZ with outside internet. Compared to the other 
solutions such as distributed one which key servers are 
distributed inside the cyber, the proposed structure is more 
convenient for construction and monitoring. As DMZ is a more 
centralized method, it makes the security monitoring system of 
smart grid more adaptive to the changes of other protocols and 
easier to maintain. 
TABLE I. MAIN ACTORS OF SECURITY MONITORING 
Actor Name Actor 
Type 
Description 
Distributed 
Energy 
Resource 
Device 
An energy generation device with 
relatively small capacity. It can be 
aggregated to provide power 
necessary to meet regular demand of 
the Smart Grid. 
Smart Meter Device 
A device which can measure the 
consumption of power in predefined 
cycles. It sends the measured 
information and user habits to the 
Smart Meter aggregator or up level 
SCADA 
Smart Load Device 
A Local device which is composed of 
EVs or energy storage systems and 
able to control load’s power 
consumption. It is able to consume or 
generate power during a certain period 
according to the received signals or 
commands. 
Distribution 
Management 
System 
Computer 
A system which provides many 
applications to monitor and control the 
distribution grid in centralized 
approaches. 
Grid System Grid infrastructure, including substations, wires, buses and so on. 
EMS Computer 
Energy Management System. EMS is 
a cluster of computers which provide 
energy management and operation 
plan for the smart grid. 
DMZ 
Gateway Device 
DMZ Gateway provides access 
control of the Smart Grid Security 
Monitoring network. It rejects the 
untrusted and unauthorized visits from 
the DMZ. 
Security 
Monitoring 
Network 
ICT 
Network 
Smart Grid Security Monitoring 
Network is a mixed communication 
network based on modern 
communication technologies like 
Ethernet, GPRS, Fibre-optical and so 
on. For local protection, in order to 
provide fast response and analysis, 
real-time Ethernet protocols may be 
used, i.e. Powerlink Ethernet or 
Ethercat. For long distance 
communication, WAN and Internet 
technologies and prototypes like 
TCP/IP, TLS, HTTPS and FTP are 
used. It is coupled with ICT networks 
in Smart Grid. Video surveillance is 
also integrated in this network. 
Demilitarize
d Zone 
ICT 
Network 
DMZ is a physical or logical 
subnetwork that contains and exposes 
an organization’s external-facing 
services to larger and untrusted 
network, usually the internet. The 
purpose of a DMZ is to add an 
additional layer of security to an 
organization’s local area network; an 
external network node only has direct 
access to servers and services in the 
DMZ, rather than any other part of the 
network. 
From the table we can see that the core actors of DMZ are 
the DMZ gateways and the servers inside the DMZ. Because of 
the relatively centralized feature, to improve the reliability of 
this structure, more than one DMZ should be configured to 
form the backup.  
B. Cyber Structure 
The cyber structure of security monitoring is shown in Fig. 
1. It employs DMZ as a guard for the intranet. All the access to 
the internet and the visit of the resources in the intranet will be 
monitored by the gateways and servers inside the DMZ. 
Different resources will be granted with different level of 
authority according to the specifications and guidelines like 
ENISA, OpenADR. Any intended access to the resources will 
be recorded and verified by the monitoring software deployed 
on DMZ gateways. Thus, the advantages of the DMZ are fully 
used and the security level of the cyber is improved further.  
Inside the intranet, servers which provide key services such 
as SCADA, EMS are distributed. The correspond DSO are 
responsible for the maintenances of these hosts and any access 
to these facilities can be easily recorded and monitored through 
the methods in mentioned guidelines or by video cameras. The 
monitoring software deployed within the intranet focuses on 
data flow analysis. Abnormal data flows can be used to 
diagnose the communication problems, invalid port access, and 
potential network violations. This function is significant to 
keep the Smart Grid communication network operating in a 
secure, load-balanced and high performance state. The whole 
cyber was modelled and analyzed using the tool SGAM-
toolbox which is an extension for Smart Grid architecture 
modelling. 
The Security Monitor Network (SMN) can be independent 
or coupled with the cyber according to the communication 
loads of the paths. In the links with less requirement of delays 
and bandwidth, the SMN can use the cyber directly to transfer 
data. However, to monitor the links with higher requirement of 
the bandwidth and delays, the monitor node of it should use 
independent communication path to analyze the monitored data 
and transfer it.  
With this configuration, the access paths to the core 
resources are limited. In some degree, the SCADA system and 
EMS system can focus on their kernel functions without caring 
the security monitoring of the network. The communications 
which require high performance of the network are kept away 
from the influences of security monitoring system. Although 
the security monitoring pressure increased in the DMZ, we can 
use several DMZs to share the pressure and provide higher 
reliability. Meanwhile, the visits from the outside internet are 
not influenced, the resources are exposed transparently to the 
users who are authorized and verified. 
III. STANDARDS EXPLORATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF SECURITY 
MONITORING SYSTEM 
With proposed cyber structure, related standards should be 
deployed on different dimensions. The standards can be 
classified into two categories, namely information standards 
and communication standards, according to the problems they 
intend to address. In this paper, rational utilization of standards 
and protocols in proposed cyber structure are discussed.  
The Smart Grid’s DR communications are assumed to be 
modelled and operated in OpenADR framework. OpenADR is 
a research and standards development effort for energy 
management led by North American research labs and 
companies. It employs the leveraging of the market to balance 
power generation and consumption. Usually, the 
implementation of OpenADR specification uses XML as a tool 
to define DR signals and data models. Because no specific or 
proprietary technologies is restricted to OpenADR itself, 
practical and well-designed security monitoring system 
becomes a critical part of Smart Grid. For example, one of the 
security monitoring system’s functions is to protect DR data 
and signals from forgery and interception, making sure that the 
grid operates in a safe and reliable environment, this can be 
guaranteed by only monitoring the XML data flows without the 
consideration of DR level. Whilst, users’ privacy should be 
preserved, attacks should be detected by monitoring the data 
flow and cyber loads, these targets can be achieved by using 
current security mechanisms such as described in IEC 62443. 
Besides, the security mechanisms employed by OpenADR 2.0 
[7] are common ones without any modification. The whole use 
case is based on the Public Key Infrastructure certificates (PKI) 
whose cryptography algorithms are normally RSA and ECC 
with the certificate type of X.509v3. 
Due to the security monitoring standards and mechanisms 
mentioned by OpenADR are mostly deployed in DMZ 
physically, the influences of the changes in OpenADR are 
reduced, and it will rarely block the operation of SCADA, DR, 
and EMS systems. While in the distributed solutions, normally 
the SCADA and DR are highly coupled with the security 
monitoring system. Thus, the changes in the mechanisms may 
cause the core functions of the smart grid to pause. Besides, the 
mechanisms should be inclined to the legality, integrity and 
validity of the information providers and receivers, while the 
correctness of the data inside the information should be 
guaranteed by the other applications.  
Currently, the development of security approaches 
sometimes lags behind the development of communication 
technologies. Many leaks are found after the deployment of the 
communication system. However, it is an inevitable fact that, 
to improve the cyber performance, more and more novel 
techniques have to be utilized or verified to satisfy increasing 
users and enhance their experiences, such as Power Line 
Communication (PLC), IEEE 802.11ac, 5G, etc., although the 
PLC standards have been used for decades in the utility 
industry for remote metering and load control applications [8]. 
So the security monitoring must rely on the relatively matured 
standards and technologies like TSL, HTTPS first, whilst be 
adaptive for the application of novel methods. Both 
Information standards and communication standards in 
SmarterEMC2 can be divided into two categories from the 
view of security, namely the security technology and security 
mechanisms. For the communication standards, security 
technologies should be guaranteed by themselves, i.e. no 
matter PLC or Wi-Fi, they should consider their own 
techniques against eavesdrop, cracking, etc. when any 
extension is made. For information standards, the design of 
security mechanism is the main concern. It should be complete 
and leak less. However, OpenADR, one of the most applied 
standards in all use cases, didn’t specify the concrete standards 
to use for addressing security issues. Mixing of different 
security standards due to no universal recommendation may 
cause safety problem. 
 
 
Fig. 1 The cyber structure of security monitoring system for smart grid 
 
Fig. 2 Information flow of Demand Response Activities with security monitoring system 
A. Deployment of Information Standards 
 The term “Information Standards” mainly refers to the 
standards which format the exchanged data and give models of 
communicated entities. In construction of Smart Grid network, 
information standards such as IEC61850, IEC 61968, IEC 
61970, etc. are consulted commonly. Most of these standards 
are oriented to high level applications and implemented by the 
combination of several communication technologies like COM, 
XML, and SOAP. The security monitoring system is 
responsible for preventing these XML signals or TSL packages 
from intercept and forging. After designing the deployment, the 
information objects generated by all the related actors can be 
derived according to the guidelines. For instance, in this use 
case, the information objects to be monitored are illustrated in 
Fig. 2. 
B. Deployment of Communication Standards 
The term “Communication standards” mainly refers to the 
standards and protocols which define the detailed techniques 
and methods of communication. These kinds of standards and 
protocols used in Smart Grid can be diverse due to the different 
technique requirements of communication. Besides, these 
communications usually related to the operation of VPP and 
DER, or information from SCADA and data sampler. Thus it’s 
better to locate these networks behind the DMZ. The sample of 
security information which used in security assessment relies 
on these standards as well.  
C. Acess Sequence of the Proposed Cyber 
 After the standard deployment, we pick up several primary 
use cases to depict the functions of this structure when the user 
wants to have access with the resources inside the network. 
TABLE II. TIME SEQUENCE OF THE INTERNET ACCESS CONTROL 
 
The Internet access is the most common requirement for the 
islanded cyber. Because of the employment of DMZ, the 
number of the access points is limited, so it is easier to monitor 
the internet activities than the networks whose internet access 
Step 
# 
Triggering 
Event 
Description of 
the Activity 
Information 
Producer 
Informatio
n Receiver 
1 
Request 
resources in 
the security 
monitoring 
network 
Request resources 
such as printer, 
server, or some 
services in the 
security 
monitoring 
network 
Internet 
service server 
DMZ 
Gateway 
2 Verify identity 
Verify identity, 
certificates, 
credential and 
authority 
Authenticatio
n Server 
DMZ 
Gateway 
3 Log the visit Log the visit into database 
DMZ 
Gateway 
DMZ 
Gateway 
points are distributed. Thus, in this kind of network, the 
sequence of the internet activity is shown in the figure 3 and 
table II. If the cyber is constructed without DMZ, the internet 
access servers or gateways may distributed in the network and 
become harder to cooperate with other services.  
 
Fig. 3 Time sequence diagram of Internet access control 
Besides the internet access control, the authentication control is 
another important part of security monitoring, all the visitors 
outside and inside the cyber will be authenticated by the 
authentication server. The progress of the authentication are 
listed in the table III and figure 4.  
TABLE III. TIME SEQUENCE OF THE USER AUTHENTICATION CONTROL 
 
 
Fig. 4 Time sequence diagram of Authentication control 
The last case is the security monitoring and communicatoin 
flow. In this case, the data of communication flows is collected 
by the SMN, then it will be analysied by the DMS to determine 
whether there are abnormal data flows and whether the cyber is 
suffer from port scaning or other attacks. Then the SCADA 
will generate the reports to the administrators. The procedures 
are shown in table IV and fig. 5. 
TABLE IV. TIME SEQUENCE OF THE SECURITY MONITORING AND 
COMMUNICATION FLOW CONTROL 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Time sequence diagram of Security monitoring and communication flow 
control 
IV. CONCLUSION 
With proposed cyber structure, the Smart Grid 
communications are adaptable for security monitoring. The 
analysis in this paper shows that it also has the adaptability for 
the changes in both security related standards and the 
communication standards. Besides, due to the guard of the 
DMZ, construction of special network for security monitoring 
is minimized because the monitoring system can share the 
same network when particular requirements are satisfied. The 
employment of DMZ not only improves the security of the 
whole network, but also isolates the communicating load, 
which mitigates the influences caused by users’ visits outside 
the DMZ. From the view of legal users, the resources inside the 
smart grid still remain apparent. Because most of the security 
monitoring mechanisms are realized inside the DMZ and the 
monitoring loads are undertaken by the DMZ gateways and the 
related servers inside the DMZ, the kernel servers behind the 
Step 
# 
Triggering 
Event 
Description 
of the 
Activity 
Information 
Receiver 
Information 
Exchanged 
1 Request Authority 
Request 
authority 
from the 
authentication 
server 
Authenticatio
n Server 
Identity 
Information 
2 Verify identity 
Verify 
authority 
request and 
user identity 
DMS Authority information 
Step 
# 
Triggeri
ng Event 
Description of 
the Activity 
Information 
Receiver 
Information 
Exchanged 
1 
Receive 
sample 
data 
Receive data 
sampled from 
Distribution IED, 
Smart Meter, VPP 
and Smart Load 
DMS Data load information 
2 
Analyze 
data 
loads 
Monitor abnormal 
port scanning 
packets 
DMS 
Network 
detecting 
actions or 
DDOS attack 
3 
Analyze 
abnormal 
data 
loads 
Analyze 
distribution of 
data loads 
DMS Abnormal data loads 
4 
Obtain 
attack 
informati
on 
Request logs from 
DMZ gateway to 
get more details 
DMZ 
Gateway 
Gateway 
logs 
5 Generate report 
Generate cyber 
abnormal situation 
report 
SCADA 
Abnormal 
situation 
report 
DMZ can focus on their own business and consequently, the 
performance of them will be enhanced. 
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